Ing. Vojtěch Miškovský, Ph.D.

Side-channel analysis is an important topic of computer security as it enables an attacker to reveal sensitive information even if it is protected by cryptographically strong algorithms. It has been more than twenty years since first side-channel attacks were proposed, nevertheless, this topic still offers many research challenges. Attacks against the forthcoming postquantum cryptographic algorithms or so far less researched algorithms, e.g., ARX-based ones, are very actual topics. Another one is utilization of artificial intelligence in SCA. Non-interference and gadget composition are current hot topics in area of SCA countermeasures as so as is high-level synthesis. The subject of the proposed dissertation thesis aims to these challenges and related research areas.

Ing. Vojtěch Miškovský, Ph.D.

Dr.-Ing. Martin Novotný

Department of Digital Design

Side-channel cryptanalysis pose a serious threat to many modern cryptographic systems. Typical side-channel attack consists of an active phase, where data are acquired, and an analytical phase, where the data get examined and evaluated. A software toolkit is presented in this thesis, which includes support for cryptographic device control, oscilloscope data acquisition, data preprocessing, statistical analysis and evaluation of the attack. The toolkit is composed of non-interactive text-based utilities with a modular plug-in architecture, and it is released under open-source licence.

Thesis on DSpace

Ing. Vojtěch Miškovský, Ph.D.

Ing. Petr Socha

Department of Digital Design

To mount a power analysis attack on a cryptographic device, one has to acquire up to millions of power traces of the attacked device. The goal of this thesis is to create a toolkit which will make the power traces acquisition faster whilst supporting as many different cryptographic schemes as possible. The toolkit will focus on hardware implentations of cryptographic schemes in FPGA.

Thesis on DSpace

Ing. Vojtěch Miškovský, Ph.D.

Ing. Petr Socha, Ph.D.

Department of Digital Design

This work deals with testing the security of control units for cars, more specifically, secure onboard communication via the CAN bus. Side-channel attack, flash of modified firmware, and extraction of bootloader over JTAG were attempted. The result is a successful attack with correlation power analysis of SipHash algorithm. However, I failed to use it for a real control unit, because of inability to find the computation in the measured data. The benefit of this work is the analysis of possible attacks on control units and successful side-channel attack on SipHash.

Thesis on DSpace